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Abstract 
This paper focused on law reform in Indonesia post-Soeharto period. It analyses 
whether the promotion of justice has been conducted. It aims to analyse whether the law 
reform during the reign of B.J. Habibie impeded on the promotion of justice. This paper 
takes the position that the promotion of justice was absent during Soeharto’s 
presidency, and through an analysis of five law reforms introduced after his downfall - 
No. 2 of 1999 on Political Parties, No. 3 of 1999 on General Elections, No. 28 of 1999 
on Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, No. 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of 
Corruption and No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. It is argued that that the laws 
introduced during the Post-Soeharto era did not see to the complete promotion of 
justice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Encyclopaedic Australian 
Legal Dictionary defines law reform as 
the modification of law, through the 
elimination of defects, the 
simplification of current law or the 
adoption new enforcement methods, in 
order to ensure the promotion of 
justice. 1   The concept of justice is a 
considerably disputed term, and 
therefore to determine the elements of 
which it is comprised, one must look to 
                                                            
1  LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic 
Australian Legal Dictionary (at 6 February 
2015) ‘Law Reform'. 
the literature of jurisprudence. Focusing 
on the law reform in Indonesia during 
the Post-Soeharto period, 1998-1999, 
this paper aims to analyse whether the 
law reform during the reign of B.J. 
Habibie impeded on the promotion of 
justice. This paper takes the position 
that the promotion of justice was absent 
during Soeharto’s presidency, and 
through an analysis of five law reforms 
introduced after his downfall - No. 2 of 
1999 on Political Parties, No. 3 of 1999 
on General Elections, No. 28 of 1999 on 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, 
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No. 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of 
Corruption and No. 39 of 1999 on 
Human Rights, 2  it will be concluded 
that the laws introduced during the Post-
Soeharto era did not see to the complete 
promotion of justice. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses juridical-
normative method, including reviewing 
and analysing justice issue in post-
Soeharto Era. The approach used in this 
paper is conceptual and statute 
approach. The concept of justice in 
Indonesia will be analysed both during 
Soeharto Era and post-Soeharto Era. 
Legal analyses conducted towards 
                                                            
2 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 2 of 
1999 On Political Parties] (Indonesia) [author’s 
trans]; Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 3 of 
1999 On General Election] (Indonesia) 
[author’s trans]; Undang-Undang Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang 
Penyelenggara Negara Yang Bersih Dan 
Korupsi, Kolusi Dan Nepotisme [Laws of the 
Republic Indonesia Number 28 of 1999 On 
Organizers of the Clean and Free From 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism] 
(Indonesia) [author’s trans]; Undang-Undang 
Republik Indonesia Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 
Tentang Pemberantas San Tindak Pidana 
Korupsi [Laws of the Republic Indonesia 
Number 31 of 1999 On Eradication of 
Corruption] (Indonesia) [author’s trans]; 
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 39 
Tahun 1999 Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia [Laws 
of the Republic Indonesia Number 39 of 1999 
On Human Rights] (Indonesia) [author’s trans]. 
 
answering the question of whether a 
complete promotion of justice has been 
achieved during the post-Soeharto Era. 
 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
LAW REFORM AND JUSTICE 
Law reform plays a fundamental 
role in the facilitation of progressive 
change within societies, as it is the 
process in which the law evolves to 
achieve unanimity between the values 
and needs of society. Justice Michael 
Kirby states: 
[Law reform] is part of the mechanism 
of modernizing and up-dating our legal 
system to make it more just and more 
relevant to the problems of today. [The 
law must be reviewed] in a systematic 
way, modernizing it where necessary 
and changing it where the change will 
lead to improvement. Law reform is not 
change for its own sake. It is change for 
the better.3 
If law reform is the alteration of 
legislation to ensure the achievement of 
justice,4 it must be determined what is 
required to ensure that the reform is 
                                                            
3  Chief Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Law 
Reform and Class Actions’ (Speech delivered at 
the Australian Society of Senior Executives, 
Sydney, 31 July 1979) < 
http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories
/speeches/1970s/vol4/1979/112-
Aus_Society_of_Senior_Executives_-
_Law_Reform_and_Class_Actions.pdf>. 
4 LexisNexis, Above n 1. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
62 
 
‘just’, or alternatively, what makes it 
‘unjust’. As the requirements to achieve 
justice may vary from one individual to 
another, as L.B Curzon explains in his 
book The Dictionary of Law, one must 
reconcile the various definitions of the 
literature of jurisprudence to determine 
the definition of such a difficult legal 
concept.5 
Alf Ross states, “justice is the 
correct application of a law, as opposed 
to arbitrariness”, 6  whilst Edgar 
Bodenheimer believes, “justice 
demands that freedom, equality and 
other basic rights be accorded”.7 Brian 
Barry, a strong believer of democracy, 
suggests justice may only be evident 
when society is ruled under “a political 
system in which parties represent the 
distinctive interests and aspirations of 
different groups”. 8  Conversely, John 
Stuart Mill takes a more structured 
approach, suggesting that the concept of 
justice has two elements: 
[A] rule of conduct and sentiment which 
sanctions the rule. The first must be 
                                                            
5 Leslie Basil Curzon, The Dictionary 
of Law (Trans-Atlantic Publications, 5th ed, 
1998) 37. 
6 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (The 
Lawbook Exchange, first published 1959, 2012 
ed) 173.  
7  Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: 
The Philosophy and Method of the Law 
(Harvard University Press, 2nd ed, 1967) 4.  
8  Brian Barry, Theories of Justice 
(University of California Press, 1991) 347. 
supposed common to all mankind and 
intended for their good; the sentiment is 
a desire that punishment may be 
suffered by those who infringe the rule.9 
Alternatively, Aristotle believes 
justice will always be achieved by the 
laws of society at the time, as they are 
superior and are the standard to assess 
what is ‘right’.10 For Plato, a sufficient 
definition of justice identifies its 
essence through the various shared 
features of a diverse range of 
definitions.11 Just as Plato suggests,12 it 
may be determined what the key 
elements of justice are from an 
amalgamation of these explanations. 
These six prominent legal 
philosophers, from varying periods of 
time and schools of thought, arguably 
derive the elements necessary for law 
reform to achieve complete and utter 
‘justice’: (1) equality before the law, (2) 
enforce the ideals of democracy, and (3) 
an absence of arbitrariness. Equality 
before the law is the principle in which 
all persons of a state are subject to the 
same treatment by the law, in 
                                                            
9  John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 
(Hackett Publishing Company, 2nd ed, 2002) 61. 
10  Aristotle, Politics (University of 
Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 25. 
11  Plato, Laws (Dover Publications, 
2006) 32. 
12 Ibid. 
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application and substance.13  It ensures 
that everyone is entitled to “a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial” judge, 14 
promoting the notion of due process. 
The second element, democracy, is the 
concept where every citizen has the 
opportunity to participate directly in the 
determination of the government, 
evident through a legislative assembly 
that represents the whole people. 15 
Finally, an arbitrary action or decision 
is one not based on reason, but on 
personal discretion or will without 
concern for the standards. 16  It is 
suggested that law reform that 
contradicts one of these elements will 
hinder the promotion of justice. 
Through this examination of 
theoretical literature, it can be submitted 
that the achievement of justice is a 
useful guide to evaluate the merits of 
law reform. Whilst it may be suggested 
that as the elements which justice are 
comprised of are disputed, and “the fact 
                                                            
13  David Byrne, ‘Equality Before the 
Law’ (1970) 2 Dublin University Law Review 
40, 41. 
14 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 14. 
15  LexisNexis, Above n 1, 
‘Democracy'. 
16 Peter Butt and David Hamer (eds), 
LexisNexis Concise Australian Legal Dictionary 
(LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2011) 34. 
that those norms employed as standards 
of justice may vary from one individual 
to another”,17 this does not ground the 
idea that the principles embodied by the 
term should be discarded simply 
because they are challenged. Key legal 
concepts that are widely debated, such 
as good governance and the rule of 
law, 18  constitutionalism, 19  and 
accountability, 20  form the basis of 
analysis in numerous esteemed authors’ 
works. Therefore the elements that 
constitute justice, as derived above, 
provide a foundation in which Habibie’s 
law reforms in the period of 1998-1999 
may be analysed.  
 
THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM IN 
1998-1999 INDONESIAN SOCIETY 
In order to determine whether 
various legislative enactments under 
President B.J Habibie’s rulership 
                                                            
17 Achmad Ali, ‘Law and Development 
in Changing Indonesia’ (Research Report, No 8, 
Institute of Developing Economies, 12 March 
2001) 104. 
18  See Nadirsyah Hosen, Reform of 
Indonesian Law in the Post-Soeharto era (1998-
1999) (PhD Thesis, The University of 
Wollongong, 2004). 
19 See Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy 
of International Law: A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15(5) European 
Journal of International Law 907, 908. 
20  See Jane Stromseth, ‘Pursuing 
Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: 
What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?’ 
(2007) 38 Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 251. 
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promote the ideals of justice, one must 
examine the laws during his predecessor 
Soeharto’s reign. Soeharto’s presidency 
was characterized by inequitable 
political policies, rampant corruption in 
judicial and investigative processes and 
lack of due process leading to human 
rights abuses. 
Soeharto’s New Order regime 
mandated a ‘closed’ political system, 
allowing the formation of three political 
parties - Golongan Karya (Golkar), 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 
and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PDI). 21  Elections were carried out 
unethically, with voting occurring 
whilst in the workplace and the absence 
of an independent supervising 
committee. 22  Under these conditions, 
the Soeharto’s Golkar party, won the 
1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 
elections with the supposed support of 
over 60% of the voters. 23  Further, 
Indonesian politics during the rule of 
Soeharto was marked with a lack of 
accountability and transparency, the 
result of rampant corruption throughout 
                                                            
21  Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, 
Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and 
Beyond (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 138. 
22 Ibid. 
23  Leo Suryadinata, ‘A Year of 
Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto 
and Rise of Habibie’ [1999] Southeast Asian 
Affairs 111, 113. 
the system. Throughout Soeharto’s rule, 
there were numerous complaints to 
authorities regarding the “rapacious 
rentier business practices” of his 
immediate family members and 
business associates,24 however due to a 
lack of impartial investigative 
authorities during this time these claims 
did not lead to prosecution. Soeharto 
ensured that the profits of corruption 
were spread throughout the government 
and legislature, so all bureaucrats, 
judges, police and the Attorney General 
had some stake. Through this 
dispensation of ‘favours’, his term in 
office continued to extend.25  
As a result of prejudiced 
political policies and rampant 
corruption, the general population took 
a stand against his dictatorship, with 
student and mass protests. However, 
with a corrupt military and a lack of due 
process, many protestors were jailed, 
tortured and killed. With the outcry by 
so many for Soeharto to resign from his 
Presidency, he did so with much 
hesitation in May 1999. On the 
following day, B.J Habibie was 
                                                            
24 Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Institutions and 
the Political Economy of Corruption in 
Developing Countries’ (Paper presented at 
Workshop on Corruption, Stanford University, 
31 February 2003) 4. 
25 Ibid. 
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appointed to the President of Indonesia 
with the expectation of reforming 
Indonesia into a fair and democratic 
nation which promotes justice for all. 
 
POLITICAL LAW REFORM 
Brian Barry, in his work 
Theories of Justice, acknowledges that a 
legal system that adopts the ideals of 
democracy will increase the likelihood 
of the promotion of justice. 26  A 
prerequisite of democracy is conducting 
uncorrupt general elections, in which 
the population is able to freely vote and 
political parties can campaign without 
fear of government coercion. President 
Habibie, in his strive to ensure the 
promotion of justice, introduced two 
legislative reforms, No 2 of 1999 on 
Political Parties and No 3 of 1999 on 
General Elections,27 to ensure Indonesia 
held its first “free and fair election” in 
1999. 28  Whilst the legislation was 
beneficial from a number of 
                                                            
26 Barry, above n 7. 
27 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 2 of 
1999 On Political Parties] (Indonesia) [author’s 
trans]; Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 3 of 
1999 On General Election] (Indonesia). 
28  Greg Baron, ' Democracy in 
Indonesia' The Monthly (online) July 2009 
<https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2009/jul
y/1360559640/greg-barton/comment>. 
perspectives, such as high voter 
participation, low violence level and a 
peaceful transfer of power, the reforms 
were also flawed with serious 
shortcomings. 29  The aim of these 
reforms was to restore the imbalances in 
the promotion of justice through 
Soeharto’s questionable politics. 
However, it can be submitted that these 
reform hindered the promotion of 
justice due to the vagueness of the laws 
resulting in arbitrary decision-making, a 
lack of appeal process offending the 
principle of equality before the law, and 
the appointment of members of the 
legislature contradicting the principles 
of democracy. 
Law No. 2 of 1999 and Law No. 
3 of 1999 do not result in the total 
promotion of justice as, due to the 
reforms’ lack of clarity, significant gaps 
are left in the law resulting in arbitrary 
decision-making. In order to remedy 
this issue and create comprehensive 
applicable laws, the National Election 
Committee (KPU) was authorised to use 
its discretion to clarify the legislation,30 
                                                            
29 Ben Hillman, ‘Electoral Governance 
and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia’ 
(2011) 39(3) The Indonesian Quarterly 301, 
302. 
30 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 3 of 
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resulting in the issuance of more than 
two hundred regulations and a 
problematic hybrid system. 31  The 
difficulties created through this 
unrestricted discretion can be clearly 
seen when observing the Election 
Commission Formation Preparation 
Committee (Election Commission), a 
body formed by the KPU to determine 
which of the political parties met the 
legal requirements to run in the 1999 
General Election. Article 39(5) states 
that the “registration of political parties 
to participate in the General Election, is 
regulated by the decisions of the 
[Election] Commission”. 32  The 
contradiction of the ideals of Pancasila 
was the only guidance to determine 
which of the 148 newly formed political 
parties met the ‘legal’ requirements to 
participate in the General Election, 33 
                                                                                
1999 On General Election] (Indonesia) art 
16(84) [author’s trans]. 
31  Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Indonesian 
Political Laws in Habibie Era: Between Political 
Struggle and Law Reform’ (2003) 72 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 483, 515. 
32 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 3 of 
1999 On General Election] (Indonesia) art 39(5) 
[author’s trans]. 
33  Loren Ryters, ‘Permuda Pancasila: 
The Last Loyalist Free Man of Suharto’s 
Order?’ (1998) 66 Indonesia 44, 44, provides 
that Pancasila is the official philosophical 
foundation of the Indonesian nation, comprising 
of five broad requirements – (1) belief in the 
one and only god, (2) just and civilized 
humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) 
article 2 providing that the 
“characteristics, aspirations and 
Political Party program [shall] not 
conflict with Pancasila”. 34  The 
determination of how to interpret and 
apply this concept was left to the 
Committee’s discretion. With no 
mechanism to ensure the correct and 
equal application of this criteria, the 
KPU and Election Commission formed 
a ‘super body’, 35  with unlimited 
discretion and able to act according to 
their own arbitrary will. As Law No. 2 
of 1999 and Law No. 3 of 1999 permit 
arbitrariness in decision-making, it 
cannot fulfill the criteria for the 
complete promotion of justice. 
Further, Law No. 2 of 1999 does 
not uphold the promotion of justice in 
its entirety as it offends the principle of 
equality before the law due to its lack of 
appeal process. Article 12 states that 
“the supervision of the provisions 
contained in this legislation is done by 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
                                                                                
democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the 
unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst 
representatives, and (4) social justice for all of 
the people of Indonesia. 
34 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 2 of 
1999 On Political Parties] (Indonesia) art 2(2) 
[author’s trans]. 
35 Hosen, Reform of Indonesian Law in 
the Post-Soeharto era (1998-1999), above n 17, 
198. 
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Indonesia”, 36  and the court has the 
ability to “dissolve or suspend” a 
political party for violation of the Act.37 
Whilst the legislation provides a 
mechanism to ensure the compliance of 
political parties with the legislature, it 
does not stipulate a dispute resolution 
mechanism for political parties who 
have been aggrieved.  The Post-Election 
Assessment Report outlines that if the 
Election Committee failed to resolve a 
complaint, an area of unfamiliarity is 
entered into, stating: 
It is not clear whether the court system 
[would] entertain and exercise 
jurisdiction over grievances arising out 
of the election process. There are no 
precedents, and the electoral legislation 
and regulations themselves are 
unclear.38 
In the example above regarding 
the Election Committee, the parties that 
did not meet the ‘legal requirements’ to 
                                                            
36 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 2 of 
1999 On Political Parties] (Indonesia) art 17(1) 
[author’s trans]. 
37 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 2 of 
1999 On Political Parties] (Indonesia) art 17(2) 
[author’s trans]. 
38  Glenn Cowan, ‘The 1999 Election 
and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: 
A Post-Election Assessment Report’(Research 
Report, The National Democratic Institution, 28 
November 1999) 10. 
participate in the General Election had 
no avenue to dispute this decision. It 
can be concluded therefore, that Law 
No. 2 of 1999 impedes upon the 
promotion of justice as the lack of 
appeal process results in denying 
equality before the law. 
The notion of democracy, where 
the legislature is representative of the 
entire population, 39  is infringed upon 
due to Law No. 3 of 1999 allowing for 
the appointment of members of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR). The 1999 election was 
conducted under the reformed system in 
which the 700-member MPR was 
composed of 462 members of the 
legislature, 38 members of the military 
and 200 members appointed by the 
government, resulting in 34% of the 
MPR being unelected officials.40 Article 
42 states that the members of the Armed 
Forces are not required to be elected via 
the General Election, but are rather to 
be appointed to their position. 41  It is 
inherently undemocratic for the 
                                                            
39  LexisNexis, Above n 1, 
‘Democracy’. 
40  Marguerite Robinson, The 
Microfinance Revolution: Lessons from 
Indonesia (World Bank Publications, 2nd ed, 
2002) 59. 
41 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum 
[Laws of the Republic Indonesia Number 3 of 
1999 On General Election] (Indonesia) art 45 
[author’s trans]. 
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reservation of seat in the legislative 
branch, and the appointment of military 
personnel raises further implications as 
to what the role of the military is – a 
voice to lead the people, or to serve and 
protect them? Further, it is the role of 
the MPR to determine the President and 
Vice President of Indonesia.42 With the 
restraints on democracy as outlined 
above, the outcome of the determination 
of the president may be significantly 
different to that of the parliamentary 
election. For example, Magawati 
Soekarnoputri was not selected as 
President in 1999, whilst her party won 
the general election, 43  raising 
implications as depth of these 
democratic ideals in which the law 
attempts to achieve. Due to this 
mechanism of appointment allowed by 
Law No. 3 of 1999 the leadership of 
Indonesia is not representative of the 
people’s choices, and therefore does not 
promote justice in its totality.  
A legal system that adopts the 
notion of democracy will further the 
promotion of justice than one that does 
                                                            
42  Donald Horowitz, Constitutional 
Change and Democracy in Indonesia 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 109. 
43 Hosen, ‘Indonesian Political Laws in 
Habibie Era: Between Political Struggle and 
Law Reform’, above n 29. 
not.44 Whilst observing only the benefits 
derived from Law No. 2 of 1999 and 
Law No. 3 of 1999, some may argue 
that justice was achieved as Indonesia 
has its first ‘free and fair’ election. 
However, due to the vagueness of the 
introduced laws resulting in arbitrary 
decision-making, a lack of appeal 
process offending the principle of 
equality before the law, and the 
appointment of members of the 
legislature infringe upon the ideals of 
democracy, these reforms did not 
achieve the promotion of absolute 
justice. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW 
REFORM  
Corruption has been a serious 
obstacle throughout Indonesia’s history 
and, arguably, reducing corrupt 
practices within the governmental and 
judicial structure has been sluggish due 
to the culture of patronage within both 
politics and business. 45  During B.J. 
Habibie’s presidency in the years 1998-
1999, two law reforms were introduced, 
Law 28 of 1999 on Corruption, 
                                                            
44 Barry, above n 7. 
45 Helena Varkkey, ‘Patronage politics 
as a driver of economic regionalisation: The 
Indonesian Oil Palm Sector and Transboundary 
Haze’ (2012) 53(3) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 314, 
315. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
69 
 
Collusion and Nepotism and Law No. 
31 of 1999 on the Eradication of 
Corruption,46 to ensure the eradication 
of corruption, the creation of an ethical 
government and to ensure the 
promotion of justice within Indonesian 
society. However, it can be argued that 
these laws fell short of the standard 
required to ensure the promotion of 
justice.  This is evident through an 
examination of the mechanisms 
introduced to fight corruption that failed 
to be implemented uniformly, and the 
laws promoted arbitrary decision-
making through the depth of discretion 
they permitted. 
Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law 
No. 31 of 1999 do not result in the total 
promotion of justice as they violate the 
foundational elements of the term, 
particularly the requirement of equality 
before the law, as the mechanisms in 
which the laws created failed to apply to 
the Golkar Party. Law No. 28 of 1999 
created an independent corruption body 
                                                            
46 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggara 
Negara Yang Bersih Dan Korupsi, Kolusi Dan 
Nepotisme [Laws of the Republic Indonesia 
Number 28 of 1999 On Organizers of the Clean 
and Free From Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism] (Indonesia) [author’s trans]; 
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 31 
Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantas San Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi [Laws of the Republic 
Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 On Eradication of 
Corruption] (Indonesia) [author’s trans]. 
called the KPKPN, which has the task 
of auditing the assets of State 
Functionaries. 47  Law No. 31 of 1999 
authorised the formation of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK), a body with superior 
investigative powers in matters relating 
to corruption. 48  However the delay in 
the formation of these bodies ensures 
the obstruction of justice, as they were 
to be established one and two years 
after the commencement of the laws, 
respectfully.49 It can be argued that the 
laws were implemented to ensure that 
the Habibie government and the 
members of parliament did not have to 
report their assets to the KPKPN, nor be 
                                                            
47 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggara 
Negara Yang Bersih Dan Korupsi, Kolusi Dan 
Nepotisme [Laws of the Republic Indonesia 
Number 28 of 1999 On Organizers of the Clean 
and Free From Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism] (Indonesia) art 10 [author’s trans]. 
48 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantas 
San Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Laws of the 
Republic Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 On 
Eradication of Corruption] (Indonesia) art 43(1) 
[author’s trans]. 
49 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggara 
Negara Yang Bersih Dan Korupsi, Kolusi Dan 
Nepotisme [Laws of the Republic Indonesia 
Number 28 of 1999 On Organizers of the Clean 
and Free From Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism] (Indonesia) art 24 [author’s trans]; 
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 31 
Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantas San Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi [Laws of the Republic 
Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 On Eradication of 
Corruption] (Indonesia) art 43(1) [author’s 
trans]. 
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the target of KPK investigations. 
Damien Kingsbury states that 
corruption was not addressed during 
Habibie’s reign as he was “himself a 
beneficiary of corruption and nepotism, 
while his party, Golkar, was able to 
function only as a result of its various 
and usually illegal money-gathering 
schemes”. 50  Neither Law No. 28 of 
1999 nor Law No. 31 of 1999 resulted 
in the complete promotion of justice as 
the mechanisms in which the created 
resulted in the violation of equality 
before the law. 
Additionally, through the failure 
to ensure the proportionate 
implementation of the laws throughout 
society, Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law 
No. 31 of 1999 breach the notion of 
equality before the law, and thus may 
not fulfil the promotion of complete 
justice. As explored above, the KPKPN 
and the KPK were granted the role of 
investigating cases of corruption, 51 
                                                            
50 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of 
Indonesia (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2002) 213. 
51 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggara 
Negara Yang Bersih Dan Korupsi, Kolusi Dan 
Nepotisme [Laws of the Republic Indonesia 
Number 28 of 1999 On Organizers of the Clean 
and Free From Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism] (Indonesia) art 17(2)(b) [author’s 
trans]; Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantas 
San Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Laws of the 
Republic Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 On 
however prosecution and conviction 
was the role of the Attorney General 
and the “notoriously corrupt, poorly-
trained, and poorly-paid judiciary”. 52 
Data from March 2000 shows that, 
despite these reforms, less than 20% of 
investigated corruption cases had been 
resolved. 53  A report submitted to the 
United Nations for the 108th Geneva 
Convention states: 
Prosecutors are generally 
unwilling to investigate cases that may 
implicate members of the Government. 
The Attorney General continues to 
apply certain manipulated or incorrect 
interpretations of law to refuse 
prosecution. For instance, the Attorney 
General has asserted the principle of ne 
bis in idem (double jeopardy) [in cases 
where it is not applicable].54  
However, statistics from the 
1998 Accountability Report show that, 
from May 1998 to June 1999, the 
number of corruption cases investigated 
                                                                                
Eradication of Corruption] (Indonesia) art 43(2) 
[author’s trans]. 
52  Dwight King, ‘Corruption in 
Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?’ (2002) 53(2) 
Journal of International Affairs 603, 611. 
53 Timothy Lindsey (ed), Indonesia, 
Law and Society (The Federation Press, 2nd ed, 
2008) 131. 
54  The International Federation for 
Human Rights, Submission to United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, Parallel Report to 
the Initial Report of Indonesia on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 10 July 2013, 5. 
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increased by 321% compared to that 
during Soeharto’s presidency.55 What is 
lacking from this report is that a large 
majority of the cases brought to the 
courts involve only minor incidents, as 
neither the Chief Prosecutor nor the 
Chief of Police were prepared to 
prosecute prominent governmental 
figures. 56  Indeed, both the Chief 
Prosecutor and the Chief of Police were 
seen as lacking integrity themselves, 
with the Chief Prosecutor later being 
forced to step down, but avoiding 
prosecution, due to his own corruption 
scandal.57 This lack of equality in the 
implementation of Law No. 28 of 1999 
and Law No. 31 of 1999 to prominent 
figures ensures that the promotion of 
justice is obstructed. 
Further, Law No. 28 of 1999 and 
Law No. 31 of 1999 allow for arbitrary 
decision-making through the depth of 
discretion they permit, resulting in a 
failure to promote justice in its entirety. 
Whilst both reforms introduced 
numerous repressive measures to reduce 
the occurrence corruption, 58  the 
                                                            
55 Lindsey, above n 51, 14. 
56 Ibid.   
57 Ibid. 
58  See Undang-Undang Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang 
Pemberantas San Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Laws 
of the Republic Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 
On Eradication of Corruption] (Indonesia) art 2-
theoretical foundation of these is, 
arguably, incorrect. The basis of these 
reforms is that imprisonment plays the 
foremost role in reducing the 
occurrence of corruption. 59  Higher 
penalties may decrease the number of 
those who participate in corruption, due 
to their deterrent effect,60 however they 
may also lead to an increase in bribes 
towards the judiciary for those who are 
not primarily deterred. Data from the 
Political & Economic Risk Consultancy 
show that corruption following the 
introduction of Law No. 28 of 1999 and 
Law No. 31 of 1999 increased, with 
grades of 8.67 in 1997, 8.96 in 1998 and 
9.91 in 1999. 61 The grades are scaled 
from 0 to 10, with 0 representing no 
corruption,62 emphasizing the failure of 
these repressive measures. Further, 
there seems to be disparity between the 
                                                                                
20 [author’s trans]; Undang-Undang Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 Tentang 
Penyelenggara Negara Yang Bersih Dan 
Korupsi, Kolusi Dan Nepotisme [Laws of the 
Republic Indonesia Number 28 of 1999 On 
Organizers of the Clean and Free From 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism] 
(Indonesia) art 21-22 [author’s trans]. 
59 Donald Ritchie, ‘Sentencing Matters: 
Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the 
Evidence’ (Research Report, Victorian 
Sentencing Advisory Council, April 2011) 2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah, 
Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index: Whose Perceptions Are 
They Anyway? (Research Report, The World 
Bank, March 2005) 10. 
62 Ibid.  
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penalties mandated in the law and the 
penalties that are imposed, evincing the 
lack of connection between limiting the 
judge’s discretion and an increase in 
penalties.63 In a context with corruption 
flourishing, this ‘discretion’ can be used 
as a means to negotiate. For example, 
whilst Law No 31 of 1999 mandates a 
4-year minimum sentence, 64  the 
Criminal Code implements a 1-year 
imprisonment as a minimum sentence 
for the same crime.65 With the Attorney 
General, police and judges able to 
choose which is ‘more applicable’ to the 
facts, there is a perception that penalties 
will be applied selectively or 
arbitrarily. 66  It can therefore be 
concluded that Law No. 28 of 1999 and 
Law No. 31 of 1999 does not promote 
justice in its totality due to the 
allowance for arbitrary decision-making 
through the depth of discretion 
permitted. 
                                                            
63 Hosen, Reform of Indonesian Law in 
the Post-Soeharto era (1998-1999), above n 29, 
11. 
64 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantas 
San Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Laws of the 
Republic Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 On 
Eradication of Corruption] (Indonesia) art 2 
[author’s trans]. 
65  Kode Kriminal [Criminal Code] 
(Indonesia) art 5 [author’s trans]. 
66 Hosen, Reform of Indonesian Law in 
the Post-Soeharto era (1998-1999), above n 29, 
11. 
It can be concluded that Law 28 
of 1999 on Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism and Law No. 31 of 1999 on 
the Eradication of Corruption do not 
ensure the promotion of justice within 
Indonesian society. The ineffectiveness 
of these reforms is evident as the level 
of corruption increased throughout 
Indonesia. Further, these laws fell short 
of the standard required to promote the 
total achievement of justice as they 
violated the notions of equality before 
the law and arbitrary decision-making. 
This is evident through the examination 
of their corruption-fighting measures, 
which were inapplicable to the Golkar 
party, a failure to implement the law 
uniformly and allowing for unrestricted 
discretion. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REFORM 
With the introduction of Law 
No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, 
Indonesia aimed to establish a legal 
foundation for the protection of human 
rights and punish the perpetrators of 
past violations. However, whilst this 
law has led to significant improvements 
in the area of establishing a legal 
foundation for the future protection of 
human rights, the implementation of the 
law has lacked in practicality. 
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Observing the legislation in isolation, it 
promotes equality before the law and 
ensures the absence of arbitrariness. 
However, issues such as the 
ineffectiveness of procedures and the 
militaristic legal culture raises questions 
as to how effectively Law No. 39 of 
1999 can promote justice. 
The content of Law No. 39 of 
1999 promotes the achievement of 
justice due to the standard of human 
rights protection it confers, thus 
ensuring equality before the law and the 
absence of arbitrariness. The content of 
the law is deemed to be within the 
minimum standard required by the 
International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ) and that required of international 
human rights law.67 Fundamentally, the 
law expanded the powers of the 
National Commission of Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM) in its role in the 
promotion and protection of human 
rights throughout Indonesia. 68  The 
newly conferred functions are “to study, 
research, disseminate, monitor and 
mediate human rights issues”, 69  and 
therefore “improve the protection and 
                                                            
67 Ibid, 205. 
68 Lindsey, above n 50, 461.  
69   Undang-Undang Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 39 Tahun 1999 Tentang Hak 
Asasi Manusia  [Laws of the Republic 
Indonesia Number 39 of 1999 On Human 
Rights] (Indonesia) art 98 [author’s trans]. 
the upholding of human rights in the 
interests of … the Indonesian people as 
a whole”.70 To ensure the independence 
of the body, article 98 ensures the 
funding of Komnas HAM is via the 
State budget, ensuring accountability to 
the People’s Representative Council 
(DPR) rather than the Cabinet, as was 
previously the case. 71  At an 
international level, Komnas HAM has 
quickly fostered a meaningful 
reputation as an impartial, outspoken, 
and conscientious human rights body, 
“often directly criticizing government 
policies, actions by the police and 
military, and highlighting human rights 
anomalies”.72 From the creation of this 
national human rights body, praised at 
an international level, it can be stated 
that the content of Law No. 39 of 1999 
creates an institution that aims to 
achieve ‘justice’, through the promotion 
of equality and the abstinence of 
arbitrariness.  
Whilst Law No. 39 of 1999 has 
led to a significant improvement the 
substance of the law, ineffective 
procedures have resulted in an inability 
to prosecute human rights violators, 
                                                            
70 Ibid, art 75. 
71 Lindsey, above n 50, 461.  
72  Philip Eldrige, ‘Human Rights in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (2001) 9(1) The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 127, 130. 
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raising implications as to whether the 
requirement of the due process of the 
law is satisfied. Whilst progress has 
been made, cases of human rights 
abuses such as arbitrary detentions, 
torture and other forms of mistreatment 
continue to be reported.73 According to 
many commentators, this is due to the 
structural issues that demand substantial 
improvements.74  The criminal judicial 
process in Indonesia is divided into four 
phases - inquiry, investigation, 
prosecution and court examination. 75 
Whilst Komnas HAM has the ability to 
inquire, Enny Soeprapto states that the 
body should have a larger role in the 
investigation stage “as there is not 
enough trust in the official organs”.76 In 
relation to the prosecution stage, Act 
No. 39 of 1999 does not outline the 
process that the judiciary should follow, 
as well as lacking clarification as to 
which court has authority in these 
                                                            
73  Hao Duy Phan, A Selective 
Approach to Establishing a Human Rights 
Mechanism in Southeast Asia: The Case for a 
Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights (Brill 
Academic Publishing, 1st ed, 2012) 49. 
74 Ibid. 
75  Theodor Rathgeber, ‘Strengthening 
Human Rights in Indonesia’ (speech delivered 
at the German Forum of Human Rights, 
Geneva’s Friedrich Ebert Stifttung Office, 5 
April 2005) 
<http://www.watchindonesia.org/Strengthening
HumanRightsIndonesia.pdf> 
76 Ibid.   
matters. 77  As a result, for five years 
from the implementation of the Act, not 
a single case of alleged human rights 
violation was judicially processed. 78 
These procedural barriers have resulted 
in the absence in the due process of the 
law, and therefore as a matter of 
practicality, Law No. 39 of 1999 does 
promote justice in its totality. 
A further barrier to the 
achievement of justice and the 
enforcement of Law No. 39 of 1999 can 
be attributed to the severity of the 
change to the substance of the law, 
which due to the legal culture of 
Indonesia diminished the notion of 
equality before the law. Monika 
Schlicher, a spokesperson for the non-
governmental organisation Watch 
Indonesia, stated, “the human rights 
situation in Indonesia has not improved 
significantly” due to the strong culture 
of militarism and the slow reform of 
police attitudes. 79  This is evident 
through the examination of the 
Semanggii tragedy that occurred months 
after the introduction of Law No. 39 of 
1999, where the Indonesian Military 
committed a grave violation of human 
rights. Students participating in a 
                                                            
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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peaceful protest were fired on by the 
military, killing numerous students and 
hapless bystanders. 80   Komnas HAM 
issued numerous summonses to those 
who ordered the attack, however they 
refused to answer due to the belief that 
their actions were lawful. 81  The legal 
culture of militarism hinders the 
applicability and enforcement of Law 
No. 39 of 1999. Due to this barrier the 
administration of justice is significantly 
problematic due to the lack of equality 
before the law.  
In summary, the introduction of 
Law No. 39 of 1999 has improved the 
legal foundation to protect human rights 
by granting Komnas HAM a greater 
role in their protection. This, in 
isolation, promotes equality before the 
law and ensures the absence of 
arbitrariness.  However, the 
implementation of Law No. 39 of 1999 
faces numerous barriers, such as 
insufficient procedures and the 
militaristic culture of Indonesia, which 
in tern, result in the absence of due 
process and equality before the law. 
                                                            
80  Katinka van Heeren, 
Contemporary Indonesian Film: Spirits of 
Reform and Ghosts from the Past (Brill 
Academic Publishing, 1st ed, 2013) 125. 
81   Hikmahanto Juwana, ‘Assessing 
Indonesia's Human Rights Practice In The Post-
Soeharto Era: 1998-2003’ (2003) 7 Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 
644, 667. 
Therefore, whilst Law No. 39 of 1999 
has assisted in the achievement of 
justice, it cannot be deemed to fulfill the 
aim of achieving total justice.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The aim of law reform is the 
promotion of justice, however without 
meeting the requirements of equality 
before the law, enforcing the ideal of 
democracy and ensuring an absence of 
arbitrariness, meeting this standard is 
unrealistic. The reforms of 1999 - No. 2 
of 1999 on Political Parties, No. 3 of 
1999 on General Elections, No. 28 of 
1999 on Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism, No. 31 of 1999 on the 
Eradication of Corruption and No. 39 of 
1999 on Human Rights – significantly 
contributed to the absence of the 
promotion of justice in its totality. 
Following the analysis of these laws, it 
is evident that the need for further 
reform is essential: the achievement of 
justice should be the priority.  
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